

## EXHIBIT NO. 174

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8. Memorandum dated November 12, 1941 from Leo Pasvolsky to Mr. Ballantine, both State Department officials, concerning a proposed economic policy which might be proposed to the Japanese.
9. Memorandum dated December 6, 1941 concerning destruction of Japanese codes at their Embassy in Washington, D. C.
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12. Documents relating to a rumor that the Australian Government had prior knowledge of the impending Japanese attack.
13. Letter dated December 19, 1941 from Owen J. Roberts, Chairman, Roberts Commission to the Secretary of State asking for a statement from him for the Roberts Commission record, and the reply of Secretary Hull.

THIS COPY IS  
RESERVED FOR DCI

Enclosure No. 1 to Dispatch  
5879 dated September 17, 1941  
from the Embassy at Tokyo

**REQUIRED**

(Bureau of Foreign & Domestic Commerce - Depart-  
ment Instruction June 25, 1941, File 102.81/4978)

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**STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL**

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FINANCIAL DIVISION  
DEC 5 - 1941  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

OCT 30 1941

Strictly Confidential Fortnightly Background  
Report No. 1

REPORT FOR PERIOD FROM SEPTEMBER 1 - 15

DIVISION OF COMMERCIAL  
POLICY AND AGREEMENTS  
DEC 9 1941  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

OFFICE OF THE ADVISER ON  
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC AFFAIRS  
DEC - 8 1941  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
NOV 4 1941  
Department of State

54280

From Commercial Attache

Frank S. Williams

American Embassy, Tokyo Date of Completion: Sept. 17, 1941

Date of Mailing: Sept. 22, 1941

File No. 850

ST. (5)

Enclosure:-

- 1 - Copy of Letter to American President Lines
- 2 - Memorandum on Ford Motor Company

Distribution:

- Original and 1 copy to Department
- 1 hectograph copy

- 2 -

FREEZING ORDER

While long anticipating some action on the part of the United States directed against Japan's financial holdings, the scope of the American freezing order of July 26th was not only a complete surprise, but a distinct shock to the Japanese. Their counter move had been prepared several weeks previous and, in the typical Japanese manner, was far broader and more specific and detailed than our order. We had similar orders and established routine regulations as precedents and experienced personnel to fairly and efficiently implement our order. This is the first experience Japan has had in freezing assets of a foreign power, and like the huntsman preparing a squirrel stew, they threw in all the available "scrap", the resultant concoction being extremely indigestible to American residents of Japan. The sweeping regulations embrace numerous foreign exchange control and other laws formerly in force, thus creating legal barriers against practically every liberty American individuals and corporations previously enjoyed.

Moreover the interpretation and enforcement of this array of regulations has been placed in the hands of inexperienced but super-conscientious officials who, in their zeal for detail and perfection, spiced with an inherent dislike of foreigners - now particularly Americans - have in most instances gone  
to

... is... in their... of the... order. From the numerous... Americans have reported it is quite apparent that, to a very large extent, the Japanese are utilizing these freezing regulations, another wedge to drive foreigners, especially American and British, out of Japan, Manchuria and China.

As a matter of fact Americans residing in Manchuria and occupied areas of China have been subjected to substantially more disagreeable and aggravating treatment than has been meted out to Americans living in Japan as the former areas are almost completely controlled and dominated by the Japanese military authorities. Such actions as the closing of American firms, placing Americans and their employees under strict surveillance, opening and detaining mail addressed to Americans, prohibiting Americans to travel within these areas or to depart for the United States, refusal to allow taxis to carry American passengers, in some instances actual confiscation of American property, and exorbitant demands for retirement allowances by employees of American firms, are all indicative of the prevailing animosity against the United States. This feeling also exists against British nationals but the attitude of the United States is held chiefly responsible for all of Japan's present ills.

It

- 4 -

It is not surprising that the Japanese Army is exerting every possible effort towards the steady course of eliminating all non-Japanese enterprises from areas which it controls - and particularly those areas under American and British protection. This has been proceeding with un-  
 progressive rapidity for the past several years and it is my firm conviction that Army authorities, especially the Young Officer Group, long ago reached the definite decision that their future, as the dominating force in this country, depends entirely upon their ability to conquer China or at least bring the China Affair to a successful conclusion. And failing this it would be better for the Army to go down fighting a major power.

In utilizing these personal associations, threats, bribes, and blackmail tactics, the military authorities are only openly expressing their determination to rid the Far East of foreign influence. Until that is accomplished the China incident cannot be successfully liquidated and the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere completely established.

That the Army is working through representatives from various Japanese consulates, embassies, military, police, and financial and government agencies, and through officials of our laws, is well known. This expedition is all that stands in the

- 6 -

way of an open break between Japan and the United States. The trend of future relations between these two countries, therefore, depends entirely upon the strength these two opposing Japanese forces will be able to muster.

Reverting to the freezing orders. The impact of the Japanese order on Americans in Japan would have been vastly different had the American Government first presented its plan for enforcing its order against Japanese assets and individuals to the Japanese Government with the notification that such privileges embodied therein would be extended to Japanese nationals in the United States provided similar privileges were extended to Americans residing in Japan. The voluntary granting in the United States of such liberal exemptions to Japanese residents made little if any impression on the authorities in Japan, particularly the subordinate police officials in the interior districts of Japan and in Manchuria and China. Furthermore, the idea behind the American order was not so much to impose restrictions on individual Japanese as to implement the control of Japanese assets in the United States, to prevent the use of the financial facilities of the United States in ways harmful to national defense and other American interests and to curb subversive activities in the United

Stated,

States. Japan's order was all inclusive in a general way, but in its actual enforcement it was applied specifically to American individuals, including American Government officials. From July 26th to September 18th no American individual or firm was able to negotiate a draft or check through the Japan branches of the National City Bank of New York or any other foreign or Japanese bank. No financial transactions exceeding Yen 1000 are now allowed between Japanese and designated foreigners without an official permit. Naturally such restrictions have completely stopped foreign trade and seriously disturbed business relations between local foreign and Japanese firms. However, these financial and trade difficulties have been greatly intensified by the irritating and petty regulations enforced relative to travel and the absolute refusal of police officials to allow Americans to leave Japan when there were no valid reasons for their detainment.

Another serious outcrop of the freezing order is the attitude adopted by Japanese employees of American firms. These employees have taken advantage of the prevailing disturbed situation to make exorbitant and unreasonable demands for retirement allowances. It has always been the

accepted

- 7 -

accepted practice in Japan for foreign firms and individuals to pay higher wages and salaries than the domestic scale. Such wage and salary levels, however, were in lieu of the bonus and retirement allowances provided for in the Japanese system. The enforcement of the freezing orders, other control measures, and the tense international situation naturally have seriously jeopardized the position of American business concerns in Japan and have forced a number to initiate plans for liquidating their interests. Local employees, sensing this dilemma, and inspired by certain patriotic societies, and evidently with the connivance of the police authorities, have presented ridiculous demands for retirement allowances. These have usually called for from one to three months' pay for each year of service and an additional amount equal to two years' salary. The American motion picture companies were presented with demands from their Japanese employees which, if accepted, would have necessitated the payment of approximately Yen 1,500,000. The motion picture companies have offered (with the assistance of the police and this Embassy) to settle with their staffs on the basis of one month's salary for each year of service up to five years, and one and a half months for each year beyond five years.

The American President Lines finally settled with its employees on the basis of one

month's



month's salary for each year of service, but this involved the payment of Yen 89,280.90 or U.S. \$16,237.71. The original demands are set forth in the attached copy of a letter addressed to the Kobe agent of the American President Lines under date of December 12, 1940.

Several other American companies such as Ford and Singer have received similar demands. There is attached hereto a copy of a memorandum covering a recent conversation with Mr. Benjamin Kopf, General Manager of the Ford Company in Japan, bearing on this subject.

American tea companies in Japan have been particularly hard hit by these freezing orders. Detailed reports of their position have been submitted to the Department by cable and it is sincerely hoped that something can be done to rescue them from their extremely precarious situation.

The instances cited above clearly demonstrate the wide disparity between the treatment accorded Japanese in the United States and that meted out to Americans in Japan under the Japanese order. Here it was applied with special emphasis to individuals although American business interests naturally have been compelled to temporarily curtail their activities. However, the Japanese are by far the greater sufferers.

Perhaps the phase of our order which

struck

throughout 1943 the possibility of the  
Japanese was that at least the United States has  
shown this country that it is no longer bluffing  
our negative attitude toward Far Eastern problems  
has created a sense of security in the minds of  
the Japanese people to the extent that even today  
the man in the street is convinced that war  
between Japan and the United States is impossible.  
And while this feeling still predominates there has  
developed widespread uncertainty over what sacrifices  
may be demanded for an acceptable settlement of  
the major issues.

From an economic standpoint the Japanese  
may well be disturbed for they have been given un-  
assailable proof that the United States and Great  
Britain can muddle through without their assistance.  
They can see their profitable silk business fading  
away, their millions of tons of merchant marine  
standing idle, their cotton mills cutting operatives  
by 50%, their rayon production cut to the bone,  
their iron and steel industry lagging far behind in  
output, their transportation system deteriorating  
from lack of oil, replacements and repairs, their  
agricultural output diminishing, and their financial  
strength declining. In addition they are cognizant  
of the antagonism prevailing against them throughout  
the United States and the British Empire. Moreover,  
I believe that a large percentage of the thinking

Japanese

- 10 -

Japanese people realize that it would be national suicide for their country to become engaged in an all out war with the United States and Great Britain.

The only hopeful development is that this large percentage will finally muster sufficient influence to tip the scales in Japan's favor.

F5W/10

## Enclosure:-

- 1- Copy of Letter to American President Lines
- 2- Memorandum on Ford Motor Company


## Distribution:

Original and 1 copy to Department  
1 hectograph copy

Enclosure No. 1 to Despatch No.  
5913 dated October 15, 1941  
from the Embassy at Tokyo

REQUIRED

(Bureau of Foreign & Domestic Commerce - Department  
Instruction June 25, 1941, File 102.61/4978)



Strictly Confidential Fortnightly Background  
Report No. 2

REPORT FOR PERIOD FROM SEPTEMBER  
15TH TO 27TH




STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

From Commercial Attache

Frank S. Williams

American Embassy, Tokyo Date of Completion: Sept. 29, 1941  
Date of Mailing: Oct. 23, 1941

FSW/mp  
File No. 830  
Distribution:  
Original and 2 copies to Department  
1 hectograph copy  
Enclosures:  
15 - as listed on pages



GENERAL FINANCIAL CONDITIONS

The complete cessation of trade with the United States and the major portion of the British Empire as a result of the freezing orders has notably intensified the already serious financial situation which has gradually but steadily been developing during the past four years. Today Japan is practically isolated from the money and commodity markets of all nations. Her ocean going steamers are either tied up in harbors or being utilized by the military authorities as transports. Her export warehouses are filled with stocks of merchandise which cannot be moved and on which interest and storage charges are eating away profits. Corporate business excepting munitions is being severely restricted by control measures and shortage of supplies - and profits are dwindling. The rate of increase in bank deposits is showing definite signs of receding as a result of higher operating and living costs, stagnated foreign trade, heavy shifting of industrial output to munitions and allied materials, and decreasing volume of domestic business. The rate of increase of national savings is also falling from higher living costs and dull business conditions. The supply of money appears to be short and inflation continues upward despite the strenuous efforts being exerted to combat its spreading. The Bank of Japan's note issue circulation on September 30th reached a record high for the year of

- 3 -

Yen 4,519,322,000 and is expected at the year end to far exceed the all time high mark of Yen 4,930,000,000 on December 31, 1940.

There are rumors to the effect that the Government is seriously contemplating the freezing of all Japanese assets in Japan in order to obtain necessary funds to finance the war in China and augmented military expenditures at home and in other occupied areas.

Another important phase of Japan's financial situation is the difficulty now being encountered in expending funds allotted under the fiscal budget. General industrial production is undoubtedly declining every month because of lack of supplies, labor and official restrictions. Production of war materials probably is being maintained at a fairly uniform rate, but this is questionable and even if granted it cannot long continue under existing conditions. There is reason to believe therefore that the reductions recently announced in the current year's budget allotments were made possible principally through the inability of industry to produce the goods necessary to complete the various projects contemplated when the budget allotments were approved. Also, an important point to keep in mind is that these reductions and deferments indicate the growing urgency of even the Japanese Government

- 4 -

Government tightening its belt in the face of the falling rate of national savings and the declining volume of available funds.

Then there must be a saturating point somewhere along the financial thermometer for national bonds. According to the latest Ministry of Finance report, total national bond issues for the first nine months of 1941 aggregated Yen 5,682 million and redemption Yen 5,414 million, giving a rate of absorption of 95.2%, this compared with 95.7% for the corresponding period of 1940. Bond issues for the July-September quarter represented Yen 3,360 million, an increase of Yen 1,098 million compared with the corresponding period of last year. The rate of digestion for the July-September quarter was 91.9% against 95% for the preceding quarter and 93.5% for the corresponding quarter of 1940. These figures indicate a rather significant decline in the absorption rate for the third quarter. The total amount of China Incident bonds issued from the beginning of the China Affair to October 2nd has reached the enormous figure of Yen 18,004,500,000. In other words this figure represents the amount of actual cash which has been set aside so far to finance the war in China. Of course this does not by any means represent the total expenditures for this purpose.

There

- 5 -

There are many large Japanese firms which have branches abroad particularly in the United States and the British Empire. Since the freezing orders went into effect these branch companies have been isolated from Japan and most of their normal business transactions have entirely ceased. Such interests must represent high investments in frozen funds, cargoes, equipment, staff expenses, etc., especially for concerns such as Mitsui, Mitsubishi, Okura, N.Y.K., O.S.K., and some of the large insurance companies. A report of all the holdings of Japanese interests in the United States, the Philippines, and the Hawaiian Islands based on the results of data accumulated from our freezing order would be most illuminating.

Another strain on Japan's financial situation arising from the freezing order and the resultant stoppage of foreign trade is the financing of merchandise which was destined for export. Many manufacturers of export goods are operating on small capital structures and are dependent upon rapid turnovers. There must be millions of yen worth of goods intended for shipment abroad which are now stored in warehouses with interest and storage charges rapidly mounting. Some one has to finance the owners. The Government has been called on for assistance and has promised something like Yen 70 million in subsidies but this deviation

of



- 6 -

of funds will be keenly felt in other directions.

The cessation of exports and the freeing of Japanese credits have placed Japan in a very embarrassing and serious situation in regard to the fulfillment of exchange contracts in free currencies especially Swedish kronen. There is attached hereto copy of a memorandum dated October 3, 1941, addressed to the Ambassador giving a concrete instance of Japan's inability to discharge a foreign exchange obligation. What has happened is that Japan is now in exactly the same embarrassing international financial position as "designated foreigners" are in Japan. Both have assets but neither can use them. Naturally Japan can make no purchases from abroad under such financial restrictions, for even suppliers of essential Swedish ball bearings (SKF) will not extend any credit to Japan until their matured exchange contracts have been liquidated.

This financial "encirclement" is reflected in the new trade policy now being evolved whereby Japan is to curtail her exports to other yen bloc areas and to Thailand, but at the same time exact pressure on those areas for larger quantities of all kinds of raw materials to compensate for the losses in imports from the United States, the British Empire and the Netherlands East Indies.

The

- 7 -

The prevailing shortage of practically every vital material precludes the continued large scale supply-  
ing of manufactured products to the yen bloc areas.

On the other hand the authorities here admit that the only sources of supply now available are within the co-prosperity sphere; therefore, these sources must be explored and developed in a most vigorous manner and the resultant materials transported to Japan in the shortest possible time. So now Japan is faced with the absolute necessity of attaining that self-sufficiency of which she has so often and loudly boasted.

Then we turn to Japan's complicated agricultural financial problems. The Government recently increased the official rice purchase price in Japan Proper by seven yen and decided to buy up the entire rice, wheat and barley crops, excepting small quantities allowed to be retained by the farmers for their own use. On rice alone the augmented price subsidy will aggregate something over Yen 400 million. As the official selling price has not been changed the Government will be Santa Claus to the farmers to that extent. Further expenditures will most probably be made towards satisfying the farmers of Taiwan and Cheen on their rice production.

The raw silk industry, which produces Japan's real money in so far as foreign trade is concerned, is facing certain decadence. The sudden

loss

- 8 -

loss of a cash business running into the neighborhood of Yen 450 million annually with no prospective substitute market would be a serious blow to any industry in any country. To Japan the impact is particularly staggering because of her inability to consume the surplus silk, the disorganization it has caused in agriculture and the total loss of income in foreign currencies sorely needed for the purchase of vital materials and equipment if and when the freezing orders are terminated.

Numerous other instances could be cited as indicative of Japan's increasing financial burdens and decreasing resources. The loss of income from the thousands of Japanese nationals living abroad must reach quite a sizable figure. The same would apply to the wholesale evacuation of foreigners from Japan. The increasing rate of taxation, the added pressure being exerted on individuals and private and corporate business for large scale purchases of national bonds, the steady tightening of restrictions on expenditures of all kinds, the ever mounting volume of Government disbursements, together with other factors previously mentioned in this report, all point to a definite worsening of Japan's financial position.

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Enclosure:

see next page

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September 14, 1941

1. Ordinance Governing Temporary Measures for Appraisal of Shares in Possession of Corporations.

September 21, 1941

1. Revision in Corporation Accounting Control Ordinance.

Translation from Arabic Edition - September 8, 1941

Profit Income Tax of Seven Leading Banks  
Available in First Half of This Year.

14. Bank Statements.



THIS COPY MUST BE RETURNED TO DCA

EMBASSY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

DCA  
7200

*[Handwritten signature]*

Com  
Bew  
After FE EATASR  
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No. 5969

Tokyo, November 13, 1941

SUBJECT: STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL FORTNIGHTLY BACKGROUND REPORT FROM THE COMMERCIAL ATTACHE FOR THE PERIOD FROM OCTOBER-27TH TO NOVEMBER 8TH

APR 3 1942

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

Division of FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
OCT 14 1942  
Department of State

RECEIVED DEPARTMENT OF STATE

15:42 MAR 31 PM 4 03

RECEIVED  
COMMERCIAL ATTACHE  
MAR 13 1942

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
DIVISION OF COMMERCIAL AFFAIRS  
APR 1 - 1942

711.94/2539 1/2

The Honorable

The Secretary of State

Washington

Sir:-

I have the honor to submit herewith Strictly Confidential Fortnightly Background Report No. 3 from the Commercial Attache for the period from October 27th to November 8th. I entirely concur in Mr. Williams' appraisal of the situation in Japan and in this connection reference is

respectfully

OCT 24 1942

FILED

PS/NEI

711.94  
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respectfully made to my strictly confidential  
telegram No. 1736, November 3, 3 p.m.

711.94/2406

Respectfully yours,

*Joseph C. Crew*

Joseph C. Crew.

File No. 850

FSW/mp

Enclosure: 1 - as stated

Distribution:

Original and 3 copies to Department

3  
Received *[Signature]*

Background Report No. 3  
 1941  
 from the Embassy at Tokyo

Approved for Release by NSA on 05-08-2014 pursuant to E.O. 13526  
 (Source: AD Council & Economic Committee - Department Instruction June 25, 1941, File 100. (1/4/41))

Strictly Confidential Fortnightly  
 Background Report No. 3

REPORT FOR THE PERIOD FROM  
 OCTOBER 27TH TO NOVEMBER 8, 1941

From Commercial Attache

Frank S. Williams

American Embassy, Tokyo Date of Completion: Nov. 10, 1941  
 Date of Mailing:

File No. 850

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Distribution:

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Japan's economic structure cannot withstand the present strain very much longer. For three months no supplies of oil, copper, iron, steel, aluminum and other essential products have been received from abroad. No exact data is available on present stocks of these commodities but from unofficial reports and personal studies of Japan's economy over a period of several years it is firmly believed that on the average the volume of these stocks, with the exception of fuel oil for the Navy, is relatively small - probably adequate to maintain the already unbalanced level of production and consumption for from ten to twelve months. The Navy's supply of fuel oil is generally estimated at sufficient for two years' wartime consumption.

To assure any substantial degree of success in the execution of declared wartime policies Japan's vast economic structure must be continuously nurtured. Her industries must be supplied with innumerable kinds of materials, her people must be fed, her national defenses must be substantially extended and strengthened, her transportation facilities must be improved and maintained, domestic business must be carried on and public utilities must be operated at full capacity. All of these activities demand materials and supplies, and more materials and supplies, and these in an uninterrupted flow. Japan has never even moderately been self-sufficient

sufficient in these essential materials and supplies but has always leaned heavily upon contributions from the United States and the British Empire. Today these supports have been completely removed and this nation left entirely on its own. Extensive geographical areas have been added to Japan's sphere of influence during the past ten years but these have proven very small donors of vital resources and have permitted only a slight reduction in the nation's dependency upon the United States and Great Britain.

That strenuous efforts have been and are being made to remedy this dangerous situation is all too obvious. It is equally apparent that little real progress has crowned these efforts. Given a period of another ten years some measure of success might be achieved but unfortunately for Japan her problems must be solved immediately.

No nation can erect a wall around its national defense structure. Every phase of national economy must contribute heavily to its development and maintenance. Japan in her present economic position cannot long continue without replenishment the consumption of such large quantities of essential materials in efforts to create a defense force sufficient to withstand the self-inflicted encircling pressure from the

United

United States and Great Britain. The nation of the harvest is plainly in sight. She must have access to foreign supplies of oil and other vital products in order to keep her industrial wheels turning. If she cannot obtain these supplies she must accept the inevitable or fight, and the writer firmly believes that the military leaders of Japan decided months ago that it would be far better for the Japanese Army to go down fighting a major power than to withdraw from China for any other reason.

Stripped of all pretense the glaring fact is that Japan has steered her course to the point where she now must choose one of three routes. She must either, (1) Curtail production of all types of goods, conserve her supplies of materials and drift with the current of international developments, or (2) Make an all-out effort to establish her Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere and finish the China Affair, or (3) Reach some definite understanding with the United States. The first route would mean that in another twelve months Japan's economy would be so weakened she would be unable to forcefully resist any demands imposed by the United States. The second road leads to war and national suicide. The third to the preservation of her Empire, the security of her people and the continuation of her existence.

of a major world power - but the probable loss of a certain amount of "face".

It appears, therefore, that Japan's present position briefly is this: On the one hand she can exist for say another twelve months on material now in stock and new supplies available within the Empire and her "sphere of influence". At the end of this period, however, the nation will be a weekling from both a military and economic standpoint. On the other hand by pooling her entire resources and taking a desperate gamble on victory in a short "blitzkrieg" she could, from an economic standpoint, wage what might be termed a fairly efficient war for a few months, at the end of which time she would be economically bankrupt. The remaining alternative is to forego her aggressive action in the Far East and "make the best out of a bad bargain".

There are definite signs that most Japanese leaders and very large segments of the people have conclusively abandoned the first alternative. This leaves only two moves, i.e., war or an agreement with the United States. A decision must be made in the very near future. On this decision rests the nation's destiny.

No. 950

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## DEPARTMENT OF STATE

## DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

10/3/42

D.C.A.

DCR

Reference underlying copy of  
Tokyo's despatch ~~5869~~ of  
November 13, 1941, with enclosure:

It is probable that the original  
of this despatch and enclosure  
never reached the Department be-  
cause of the ~~circumstances~~ <sup>circumstances</sup> of the war.  
If the original has not arrived,  
would you please index and return  
to me.

Also please inform me of the  
date of the last previous similar  
weekly report of the Commercial  
Attaché in Tokyo which has  
reached the Department.

FE:Salisbury

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
OCT 20 1941  
Department of State

**TELEGRAM RECEIVED**

*Tel. 222* PH \_\_\_\_\_ London

Dated October 18, 1941

DIVISION OF EUROPEAN AFFAIRS  
DEC 3 1941  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE  
OCT 20 1941  
AL VETTS

SECRETARY OF STATE  
OCT 20 1941  
NOTED

Secretary of State,

Washington.

4979, October 18, 4 p.m.

MOST SECRET FOR THE SECRETARY AND SECRETARY.

Paraphrase with memo  
U - LIAISON OFFICE  
OCT 23 1941  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

ADVISER ON POLITICAL RELATIONS  
MR. HORNBECK  
DEC 2 - 1941  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

*240.0711 P.W.*

A high official of the Foreign Office today handed an Embassy official the following memorandum of a plan for quick communication in the event of an emergency in the Far East, the need of which was realized following the staff talks at Singapore. He expressed the hope that we would place a corresponding plan into effect without delay:

"One. In the present situation in the Far East a threat from Japan might easily develop with very little warning and it is not possible to determine in advance what type of action by Japan would necessarily call for military counteraction. The British authorities concerned have accordingly been studying the problem of reducing to a minimum the delay which might be caused in such an eventuality by the necessity of intergovernmental consultation. A further problem has been to ensure that all British

DEC 4 - 1941

PS/WHA  
Confidential File

740.0011 P.W./570

-2- #4979, October 10, 4 p.m., from London.

all British authorities concerned are simultaneously and immediately warned when a dangerous situation arises.

Two. The procedure which has been devised is outlined below. It is intended to be brought into immediate effect should any one of the authorities concerned receive information indicating that Japan is about to take or has taken action which in his view may necessitate immediate military countermeasures. The authorities in question are the four commanders in chief, i.e., Far East, China, East Indies and India; the governors of Burma, Hong Kong, and Fiji; His Majesty's representatives at Tokyo, Chungking, Shanghai, Bangkok, and Washington.

Three. In the eventuality contemplated, any such authority would at once telegraph, by the quickest possible method, a code word of warning to London. He would follow this preliminary warning by a second telegram reporting the facts on which he considered it necessary to base his warning.

Four. Any telegram sent under the above procedure would be repeated by the sender to all  
the authorities

-3- #4979, October 18, 4 p.m., from London.

the authorities enumerated in paragraph two above and also to the Governments of Canada, New Zealand, the Commonwealth of Australia, and the Union of South Africa.

Five. Special arrangements have been made in London for any telegram sent under this system to be immediately dealt with by the highest political and military authorities.

Six. His Majesty's Governments in the dominions are being invited to introduce analogous arrangements.

Seven. On the receipt in London of telegrams of the nature contemplated in paragraph three above, the Foreign Office will notify both the United States Ambassador and the Netherlands Government by the speediest possible means.

Eight. It is hoped that the United States and Netherlands authorities will be willing to consider the introduction of corresponding arrangements whereby any information of threatening action by Japan which the United States or Netherlands authorities in the Far East may receive may be  
immediately



-4- #4979, October 18, 4 p.m., from London.

immediately communicated not only to London but also on a basis of reciprocity to the British Commander in Chief Far East through the most appropriate channel.

Nine. It is emphasized that the procedure proposed is merely one of urgent reporting. A decision as to action must, of course, lie with the Governments concerned."

WINANT.

WWC

## DEPARTMENT OF STATE

## PARAPHRASE

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

Telegram no. 4979

Dated: October 18, 1941,  
4 p.m.

From: London

Rec'd: October 18, 1941.

Extremely secret for the Under Secretary and Secretary.

The following memorandum was handed today to an official of the Embassy by a high official of the Foreign Office. It contains a plan providing for rapid communication should an emergency arise in the Far East. The necessity of such a plan became apparent after the staff talks which took place at Singapore. The official in question stated that he hoped that it would be possible for us to put into effect immediately a similar plan.

1. Owing to present conditions in the Far East, Japan might at very short notice become menacing, and it is impossible to decide beforehand what kind of action Japan might take which would of necessity demand military counteraction. Therefore the appropriate British officials have been making a study of the question of reducing as much as possible the delay which in such an emergency might be occasioned by the need of consultation  
between

-2-

between governments. An additional problem which has presented itself is that of making it certain that all interested British officials should receive warning without delay and at the same moment whenever perilous conditions might arise.

2. Outlined below is the plan that has been worked out. This plan is to be placed immediately in effect whenever any of the interested officials should obtain information showing that the Japanese are about to take, or have taken, measures that in his opinion might require military counteraction without delay. The interested officials are the four chief commanders, namely, China, East Indies, India, and the Far East; the Governors of Fiji, Hong Kong, and Burma; and the British diplomatic representatives at Chungking, Shanghai, Washington, Tokyo, and Bangkok.
3. If the contemplated eventuality should take place, any of these officials would communicate at once by telegraph and as quickly as possible to London a code word indicating warning. This preliminary notice would be followed by a second telegraphic message outlining the facts on which the official believed it essential to issue his warning.

4. The

-3-

4. The sender would repeat any telegraphic message sent in accordance with the foregoing procedure to all of the officials indicated in the second paragraph as well as to the Governments of New Zealand and Canada, the Union of South Africa and the Commonwealth of Australia.
5. The authorities in London have completed special arrangements so that any message transmitted according to this plan will receive the immediate attention of the highest authorities, both military and political.
6. The Dominion Governments have received invitations to put similar arrangements into effect.
7. As soon as London receives telegraphic messages of the kind indicated in the third paragraph, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs will transmit the information in as speedy a manner as possible to the Ambassador of the United States and the Government of the Netherlands.
8. The British authorities hope that the officials of the Netherlands and the United States will be agreeable to considering the establishment of similar arrangements according to which any news of menacing activity by Japan which may be received  
by

-4-

by the Dutch or American authorities in the Far East may be transmitted without delay not only to London but equally, on a reciprocal basis and by the most appropriate means, to the British Commander in Chief in the Far East.

9. Emphasis is laid on the fact that the foregoing proposed method refers only to urgent reports. It is obvious that the interested governments must determine what action must be taken.

Winant

U-L:OW:BAB

*Let's look  
at TCA memo  
11-28-41*

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
NAVY DEPARTMENT  
DEC 17 1941  
WASHINGTON  
DIVISION OF  
COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

SECRETARY OF THE NAVY  
DEC 4 - 1941  
63851  
(SC)A6-3/EF13

SECRET

OFFICE OF POLITICAL RELATIONS  
MR. HORNBECK  
DEC 2 - 1941  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

U - LIAISON OFFICE  
NOV 12 1941  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

NOV 8 1941

*Tel to London  
11/27  
[Signature]*

Sir:

In reply to State Department Liaison Officer's memorandum U-L 740.0011 P.W./570 of October 24, 1941, relative to the plan of British officials for coordination of urgent communications in case of emergency in the Far East, the following comments are submitted.

Insofar as the Navy is concerned, it is believed that the communication channels and procedures now existing are entirely adequate for the transmission of urgent and important information and for insuring that information of this nature receives the prompt attention of appropriate authorities. Adequate arrangements are in effect for full local cooperation between United States Naval and British Intelligence organization concerning Far Eastern matters.

In brief the situation is as follows:

- (a) Suitable codes and communication channels for the transmission of information have been established between the Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet and the Commander-in-Chief of the British China station and have proved effective in use.
- (b) All United States naval intelligence personnel on duty in the Far East, including those stationed in Australia, New Zealand and Colombo, have been instructed to cooperate fully with British Intelligence organs in their areas on all intelligence matters concerning Japan. British naval intelligence officers have received similar instructions.
- (c) The Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet has established and is using effectively communication channels for the transmission of information to and from United States diplomatic and consular officers in China.
- (d) At important posts other than in China the United States Naval Attache or United States Naval Observer is available to transmit important diplomatic and consular information.

DEPT. OF STATE  
DEC 6 1941  
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Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
DEC 8 1941  
Department of State

DEC 18 1941

740.0011 PACIFIC WAF/1241  
Confidential File  
PS/LEH

SECRET

to the Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet and to the Navy Department.

(e) Under routine procedure in effect all important and urgent information is transmitted direct to the Department and to the appropriate naval commanders afloat and ashore, and to appropriate naval intelligence offices. Local cooperation with the British insures that information of this nature is given on the spot to appropriate British officials for transmission to their higher authorities.

(f) Standard United States naval communication procedure provides means for insuring that important despatches receive the prompt attention of the officer or officials who are responsible for appropriate action.

(g) Adequate and effective means of rapid intercommunication have been established between the Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet and the Commander-in-Chief of the Netherlands Navy and Chief of the Netherlands Navy Department in the Netherlands East Indies.

In view of the foregoing it is believed that a special system, including special codes, for the transmission of urgent information is entirely unnecessary.

*Frank Knox*  
Frank Knox

The Honorable

The Secretary of State.

**CONFIDENTIAL**

WAR DEPARTMENT,  
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON

WD 311 (10-24-41)MC-B

Division of  
EUROPEAN AFFAIRS  
DEC 1 1941  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

NOV 26 1941

*Tel to London*

*Ed*  
*EW*  
*mg*

RECEIVED ON FEB 1 1941  
MR. HORNELL  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

MEMORANDUM FOR THE LIAISON OFFICER, DEPARTMENT OF STATE:

Subject: Plan of British Officials for Coordination of Urgent Communications in Case of an Emergency in the Far East.

1. Referring to the British proposal transmitted as an enclosure to your letter of October 24, 1941, on the above subject, the War Department is of the opinion that existing methods of communication are, in general, adequate for a rapid interchange of urgent intelligence covering Japanese military activities in the Far East.

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
DEC 1 1941  
Department of State

2. With the exception of the Philippines, the War Department has in the Far East no rapid communication facilities of its own; its representatives therefore use the United States Navy radio nets wherever possible, and otherwise commercial radio or cable. Consequently it is believed this is a matter of primary interest to the Navy Department. All military intelligence officers are in constant touch with their British and Dutch colleagues and would thus receive urgent information as quickly as under the proposed British scheme.

3. With regard to details of the British proposal, paragraph 8 of the memorandum enclosed with your letter is interpreted to mean that United States authorities in the Far East would report directly to London as well as to the British Commander in Chief of the Far East at Singapore. The United States should enter no agreement whereby its authorities in the Far East would report directly to London. The exercise of proper control by the United States Government in Washington would seem to demand that it retain sole authority to communicate with the British Government in London.

4. There appears to be no objection to the adoption of a code warning to insure that the information which follows will receive the prompt attention of the proper authorities concerned. The United States representatives in the Far East should, however, direct their communications to Washington, and, on a reciprocal basis, to Singapore and Batavia. On receipt of these messages, the State Department should promptly inform the British Ambassador in Washington. The procedure with respect to reports from United States sources in the Far East

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*U.S.*  
*811 7312*

740.0011 PACIFIC WAR/652 PS/ATB  
Confidential File

**CONFIDENTIAL**

LIAISON OFFICER  
NOV 27 1941  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
*Copied*

12-3



**CONFIDENTIAL**

would thus conform with the procedure proposed by the British for reports emanating from British sources.

5. The code word selected by the British to indicate warning should be immediately reported to the War Department to insure that the same word has not already been assigned by the United States as a code name for another purpose.

For the Chief of Staff:

*Robert N. Young*  
ROBERT N. YOUNG,  
Major, G.S.C.

**CONFIDENTIAL**

PREPARING OFFICE  
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

TO BE TRANSMITTED  
CONFIDENTIAL CODE  
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE  
PLAIN

TELEGRAM SENT

Collect Full rate  
Day letter  
Night letter

Charge Departments X

Full rate  
Day letter  
Night letter

Charge to

\$

Department of State

Washington,  
DEC 2 - 1941  
November 28, 1941

AMERICAN EMBASSY,

LONDON.  
5603

SECRET. NO DISTRIBUTION.

Your 4979, October 18, 4 p.m.

Existing communication channels and procedures are considered wholly adequate for the transmission of urgent and important information and for insuring that information of this character receives the prompt attention of the appropriate high authorities in Washington. These arrangements provide for communication between the Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet, and the Commander-in-Chief, British China station, the Commander-in-Chief of the Netherlands Navy and the Chief of the Netherlands Navy Department in the Netherlands East Indies, as well as for communication between the corresponding military authorities. Arrangements have also been made for local cooperation on the spot between American army and navy intelligence officers and their British counterparts.

In view of the foregoing it is not believed that any new arrangements need be made.

Eu: TCA: MEL  
Enciphered by

Sent by operator M., 19

This cable was sent in Confidential Code. It should be carefully paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. SC

740.0011 PACIFIC WAR/570

Confidential File

PS/WH

*DeB*  
e-5

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
RECEIVED  
NOV 28 1940  
DIVISION OF  
COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: NOVEMBER 25, 1940.

SUBJECT: FAR EASTERN SITUATION

PARTICIPANTS: SECRETARY HULL AND THE BRITISH AMBASSADOR,  
LORD LOTHIAN

COPIES TO:

*740.0011  
Pacific Area*

The British Ambassador came in at his request, having just returned from London. He referred to the Far Eastern situation with apprehension, saying that he believed the Japanese were likely soon to attack Singapore. We dwelt briefly on the general situation in the Far East as it has developed thus far. I did not undertake to specify just what the future plans of this Government in that area would or might be from month to month and week to week, but added that he knew the various steps in our program thus far, which contemplated a firm and resolute policy toward Japan, both diplomatically and militarily, and aid to China at the same time.

The main point the Ambassador raised was that there should

740.0011 P.W./40

DEC 3 - 1940

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PS-MR

-2-

should be conferences between the naval experts of our two Governments with respect to what each would or might do in case of military outbreaks on the part of Japan. I said that, of course, there could be no agreements entered into in this respect, but that there should undoubtedly be collaboration with the view of making known to each other any and all information practicable in regard to what both might have in mind to do, and when and where, in case of a military movement by Japan in the South or in some other direction.

The Ambassador said that the information he had gathered in London was that, while our Naval Attaché, Admiral Ghormley, was a good man, he consistently declined to discuss possible future plans on the ground that he had absolutely no authority. This brought him back again to the question of military consultation among appropriate officials of our two Governments in regard, for instance, to the military situation that Singapore will present from all standpoints until the conclusion of the war. He added that some naval experts felt that the American Navy might largely make its base at Singapore, and that that would safeguard the entire situation. He expressed the view that the fleet at Singapore could reach Japan much sooner than a Japanese fleet could reach the Pacific Ocean, and that, therefore, there

-3-

there would be no risk involved. I merely remarked that that was a matter for experts to pass on, and he said he hoped there would be discussion between his and our high naval officials with respect to all phases of the Pacific situation.

C.H.

S CH:MA

DeR

DEPARTMENT OF STATE


Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: December 13, 1940

SUBJECT: BRITISH ATTITUDE REGARDING JAPANESE AIMS IN SOUTH SEA AREA

PARTICIPANTS: SECRETARY OF STATE HULL AND THE BRITISH CHARGE D'AFFAIRES, MR. NEVILLE BUTLER

COPIES TO:



740.0011 P. W./56

740.0011 PW

Mr. Neville Butler, Chargé d'Affaires of the British Embassy, called at his request and said he desired to bring up a matter relating to one of the last statements of Ambassador Lothian to the effect that if the Japanese should be made to feel reasonably certain that their invasion of the South Sea countries would bring the United States into war with them, they would be fairly certain not to undertake such invasion. He then said that he was under the impression that we had already taken certain steps calculated to deter Japan from such a course. I replied that we had done so to a certain extent and in different ways, with all of which he is familiar. I said nothing more. Mr. Butler then stated that

Confidential File

DEC 30 1940

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-2-

that his Government was interested in the question of what sort of military relations from a defensive standpoint it might be possible to develop in a mutually feasible and desirable way among the South Sea countries. I replied that I had heard some British or Dutch official suggest what was considered very wise; that the British and the Dutch discuss all phases theoretically and each would readily see what the view and the attitude of the other would be under given conditions in case of a Japanese invasion and attack, and that this would in no sense involve any sort of a military or other alliance. I also added that sometime ago I had suggested to Ambassador Lothian that the British would logically discuss these matters with the Dutch and that whatever discussions the United States Government might have would be with the British only. I added that, of course, any such discussions on our part would in no sense involve any departure from our past policies of non-involvement.

C.H.

S:CH:AR



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DCR

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: MAY 27, 1941

SUBJECT: FAR EASTERN SITUATION

PARTICIPANTS: SECRETARY OF STATE HULL AND THE BRITISH AMBASSADOR, LORD HALIFAX

COPIES TO:

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL  
FROM THE SECRETARY OF STATE

711.94/2129

The British Ambassador called at his request. He referred to the casual and unofficial conversations which I have recently had with the Japanese Ambassador in regard to the possibility of instituting negotiations for a peaceful settlement in the Pacific area. He was very much interested in the matter and desired to know how soon it might be before I would know whether there were any definite grounds for taking up such negotiations. I replied that it might be very soon; that, of course, as I said to the Chinese Ambassador here some days ago, and as I have said to my associates in the Department from the beginning, I would not think of entering into any

JUL 25 1941

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PS Confidential File



any discussions looking to an agreement without first having full and free conference with the Chinese representatives. I then added that the three basic points I am constantly keeping in mind relate to a satisfactory Chinese settlement, assurances that the Japanese will not go South for purposes of military conquest, and assurances that they will not fight for Germany in case the <sup>United States</sup> Japanese should be drawn into the war. I concluded by saying that everything naturally revolved around these phases. The Ambassador seemed to be pleased with this view.

C.H.

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 740.2011 P.W.  
 \*

\* Correction made by  
 direction of Mr. Stone (S)  
 5-28-41 DCR/mgB

S CH:MA

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
RECEIVED  
SEP 25 1941  
DIVISION OF  
COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

ADVISED ON POLITICAL RELATIONS  
MR. DUNN  
SEP 24 1941  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

PAID  
EV

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE:  
September 23, 1941

SUBJECT: Conversations between Japan and United States

PARTICIPANTS: British Chargé, Sir Ronald Campbell;  
Under Secretary, Mr. Welles

COPIES TO: S, PA/H, FE, PA/D, Eu

DIVISION OF  
EUROPEAN AFFAIRS  
SEP 24 1941  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

711.94/2327

The British Chargé d'Affaires, Sir Ronald Campbell, called to see me this morning at his request.

Sir Ronald first stated that he had received a telegram from Mr. Eden requesting that Secretary Hull be informed that the Secretary's wishes with regard to information concerning the conversations proceeding between the United States and Japan had been scrupulously observed by the British Government. Mr. Eden stated that no reports concerning these conversations are being circulated to British missions and that the very small number of members of the British Government advised concerning the conversations had been impressed as to the complete secrecy of these reports.

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SEP 25 1941

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
ADVISER ON POLITICAL RELATIONS

ADVISER ON POLITICAL RELATIONS  
M.C. ...  
SEP 17 1941  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

~~241D~~

September 16, 1941

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DE ✓  
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Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
SEP 17 1941  
Department of State

SEP 17 1941  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

711.94

Baron van Boetzelaer, Minister Counselor of the Netherlands Legation, came in to see Mr. Atherton and myself today to say that the Minister of the Netherlands had asked him to come to the Department to inquire whether there was any information we could give the Legation with respect to the reported conversations between the American and Japanese Governments.. The Minister Counselor said that the Netherlands Government were, of course, very much in favor of the maintenance of peace in the Pacific and hoped that some arrangements would be eventually arrived at which would avoid the extension of hostilities to the Far East. He went on to say, however, that the Netherlands Government were extremely interested in the economic aspects of the Far Eastern situation, that they were carrying out certain measures now which had a bearing on such important questions as petroleum and other

711.94/2323


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SEP 17 1941

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-2-

products, and they were very anxious to be informed as soon as possible of any situation which might have an influence on the economic measures now in effect or planned in the Netherlands Indies.

Both Mr. Atherton and I informed Baron van Boetzelaer that for information with regard to the Far East we would suggest that he speak to Mr. Hamilton or Dr. Hornbeck. Baron van Boetzelaer said that he had spoken with Mr. Hamilton and Dr. Hornbeck from time to time but the Minister wished to have the desire of the Netherlands Government for information on the present situation in the Far East also laid before the offices concerned with European Affairs as well. We further added that we realized fully the interest of the Netherlands Government in developments in the Far East and that if we ever had any information which would be of interest to that Government we would take immediate steps to communicate with him.



James Clement Dunn

PA/D:JCD:FMB

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

Division of  
EASTERN AFFAIRS  
NOV 21 1941  
Department of State

CJ  
This telegram must be  
closely paraphrased before  
being communicated  
to anyone. (C)

London  
Dated November 18, 1941  
Rec'd 12:02 p.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

DIVISION OF  
EASTERN AFFAIRS  
NOV 19 1941  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

ADVISED ON POLITICAL RELATIONS  
JUN 30 1943  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

November 18, 4 p.m.  
NETHERLANDS SERIES 46. FROM BIDDLE.

Dr. Van Kleffens yesterday spoke to me  
with great concern regarding the Netherlands  
Government's lack of knowledge of the trend  
of conversations with Admiral Nomura. He  
said they were extremely unhappy over their  
complete ignorance. The Netherlands Indies  
were after all in the most exposed position  
and if the United States became involved  
in war with Japan the Netherlands Empire  
would likewise consider itself at war with  
that power. This being their position they  
felt that their natural desire for information  
was comprehensible.

They had had no information from us  
concerning these talks since August 17. On Oct-  
ober 9 Dr. Loudon was asked to inquire as to  
the situation

H.P.W.

HNS

740.0011 P. W. /628

Confidential File  
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JUL 3 - 1943

-2- Unnumbered, November 18, 4 p.m. from London.

the situation and again on November 10. He was told to stress that the Netherlands Government did not consider it indiscreet to express the earnest hope that they might be kept informed since their interests were most immediately at stake. Being so long without information they could not judge how their interests were being affected. Should the conversations break down they would have to review the situation with a view to making the necessary dispositions. At such a time a matter of 48 hours delay might prove vital.

Van Kleffen said that thus far they had received no reply to these instructions. Meanwhile messages from Batavia indicated that Government circles there despite their normal stolidity were highly nervous and indeed alarmed, a situation attributable mainly to their being left in the dark. He therefore very earnestly hoped we might see our way clear to making available some information. He felt that in the circumstances even a negative reply was preferable to no reply.

I should

-3- Unnumbered, NOVEMBER 18, 4 p.m. from London.

I should add that members of the Netherlands Government have not infrequently referred to their inability to obtain information regarding our conversations with Japan and have asked me whether I had any information. I have on these occasions pointed out the inherent difficulties in stating precisely what the situation may be at any given moment with conditions so fluid and delicate. I have felt, however, that I should accede to Dr. Van Kieffen's present request to let you know their state of mind.

WINANT

CEB

DCR

## DEPARTMENT OF STATE

*Memorandum of Conversation*

DATE: SEPTEMBER 4, 1941

SUBJECT: U.S. - JAPANESE RELATIONS

PARTICIPANTS: SECRETARY OF STATE HULL AND THE CHINESE AMBASSADOR,  
DR. HU SHIH

COPIES TO:

... 1-1402

The Chinese Ambassador called, at his request and said that he had come to inquire about the reported conversations between Japan and the United States. I said that I had hoped to be able within a week or two to send for the Ambassador and give him somewhat definite information as to the course of these conversations, meaning by this that I had hoped by that time they would have taken such a definite turn one way or the other that I could tell him something new in addition to what I said to him some months ago on this same subject. I added that I would be glad now, however, to make known to him anything I knew that would be of interest in the foregoing connection;

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CONFIDENTIAL FILE

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-2-

connection; that the same casual or exploratory conversations after an interruption of several weeks were now going on; that they have not reached any stage that would afford a basis for negotiations; that, as I promised the Chinese Ambassador at our meeting some time ago, this Government would not think of any negotiations that would affect the Chinese situation without first calling in the Ambassador and talking the entire matter over with him and his Government, as I would talk it over with the British, the Dutch and the Australians.

I then gave the Ambassador in very strict confidence the chief points which are set forth in the record of conversations and exchanges of memoranda between the Japanese Ambassador and myself and between the Ambassador and President Roosevelt. I made some reference to the military situation, as I had in my other conversations, stating that we were continuing to treat it as a world military movement. I then reviewed the military possibilities, pro and con, both in the West and in the East.

The Ambassador made it rather clear that China did not desire any peace at this time. His theory seemed to be that Japan was showing signs of weakening - which did not necessarily mean an early collapse - and that within a reasonable

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-3-

reasonable time she would be obliged to abandon any aggressive military activities and to seek peace.

I brought out several possible developments that might occur in future, such as the possible collapse of Japan, referred to by the Ambassador; the possibility of Japan's adopting all the basic principles of peaceful and normal international relations which this Government has been preaching and practicing, as well as applying those principles in a satisfactory manner; the possibility of Japan's endeavoring to face both ways by entering into an agreement whereby under an implied reservation which Japan would contend for she would have a right to exercise force against another country or countries in a given set of circumstances; and the possibility that the governments opposed to Japan, including the United States, might refuse to enter into a peace settlement at the present time. I said that any of these developments might arise and that it was a question of the attitude towards each other of the governments concerned, if and when any of the foregoing possibilities should arise.

In conclusion I said that I would be only too glad to keep in close contact with the Ambassador in connection with this entire matter.

C.H.

S CH:MA

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

KD

GRAY

FROM Chungking via N.R.

Dated December 4, 1941

Rec'd. 3:18 a.m., 6th

*T.M.*

*RS*  
*note* L

Secretary of State,

Washington.

470, December 4, 9 a. m.

The Chinese press has continued to give close attention to the American-Japanese talks. The burden of comment is that the talks are doomed to failure largely because of the intransigence of Japan's leaders as shown in Tojo's recent bellicose statements, the reaffirmation of the Anti-Comintern Pact, and warlike preparations in Southern Indochina. The only possible solution of the situation is war and it is therefore vital for the democracies to seize the initiative which may best be carried out by a military alliance of the ABCD powers and Russia. Confidence in the United States has been maintained and foreign news reports of urgent Chinese representations at Washington inferentially induce a proposed agreement have been excluded from the Chinese press.

Sent to Department; repeated to Peiping.

GAUSS

EPD

*711.94*

711.94/2548

PS/AD FILED  
DEC 11 1941

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TELEGRAM RECEIVED

ADVISER ON POLITICAL RELATIONS  
NO. 00000001  
DEC 18 1941  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

TEM

Batavia

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (br)

FROM Dated December 2, 1941

Rec'd 4:18 p.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
U. S. LIASON OFFICE  
Department of State

*7-2-41*  
*2-3-41*  
*W. C. ...*  
*U. S. M. D.*

DIVISION OF  
EUROPEAN AFFAIRS  
DEC 15 1941  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

217, December 2, 4 p.m.

APR -3 1942  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Note  
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The Japanese steamship HUSI (FUJI) left

Surabaya November 29 for Keelung with 1800 Japanese men, women and children evacuated from the Netherlands Indies. This leaves only 400 to 500 Japs in this country against about 7,000 on July 1. These evacuations have occurred since the beginning of the present American-Japanese discussions in Washington, but chiefly during the past three weeks.

A few days ago the Japanese Consul General warned all of his local nationals through various Japanese organizations that the HUSI would be the last evacuation ship to visit this country and that evacuation was desired by the Japanese Government. Representatives of Japanese shipping companies, banks, retailers and other firms then met with the Japanese Consul General who emphasized the desire of his Government that evacuation proceed as quickly as possible.

740.0011 PACIFIC WAR/666 PS/RK

DEC 17 1941  
FILED

226

-2- #217, December 2, 4 p.m., from Batavia.

possible. During this meeting the following decisions were made: all small shopkeepers to turn their stocks over to a large retailer and then evacuate, the large firm to retain only a skeleton staff to liquidate the business; all small importers to follow the same procedure; shipping companies to close branches in the Netherlands Indies and retain only a small staff at one main office; banks to ask for further instructions from Japan but Yokohama Specie Bank will probably be the only one to remain; Japanese plantations and Borneo Oil Company to retain only nucleus staffs; consular officers to remain except for women and children.

The general opinion, both official and civil, is that hostilities are unavoidable and that the Netherlands Indies will be attacked in the near future. All elements of the Netherlands Indies army were mobilized today in outer possessions but not in Java. On the other hand, all air force reservists were mobilized today throughout the Netherlands Indies. They will not be concentrated, however, but will remain at their home bases at least temporarily.

Local

-3- #217, December 2, 4 p.m. from Batavia.

Local reaction to our discussions with Ambassadors Nomura and Kurusu is that time is being lost; that Japan must be fought and that it is dangerous to delay further; that Japan is in a hopeless position, being unable to retreat from her announced policies and that she must continue her aggressive policy unless stopped by force of arms.

FOOTE

NK

DCR: Please teletype to Navy under confidential classification, endorse sending time and return to U-L, Room 185.

FROM STATE DEPARTMENT FOR OPNAV:

Following received 12-2-41, 4:18 p.m. from  
Batavia dated 12-2-41, 4 p.m., no. 217.:

On November 29 the HUBI (FUJI), a Japanese steamer cleared Surabaya with 1800 Japanese men, children and women for Keelung. These passengers were withdrawn from the Dutch Indies.

FOOTE

UL:EMA  
Teletyped and confirmation sent NAVY 12-3-41.  
copy to SA/T 12-3-41.

DN 27  
R3P 12-3-41

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY



November 12, 1941

FE

Mr. Ballantine:

Attached is my suggestion for a document on economic policy which might be handed to the Japanese. For the sake of convenience, it is in the form of a joint declaration on economic policy. I think it covers all of the points that should be of interest to us, and it ought to be acceptable to the Japanese.

The only question in connection with the draft is whether or not we are prepared to state, in the form indicated in paragraph 4 of section II, our intentions with regard to Cuban preference. As the Secretary knows, we have discussed this matter a great deal but have never reached a definite decision. He may want to give that point some special consideration.

Mr. Hawkins has read the attached draft and concurs fully.

*L.P.*  
Leo Pasvolsky

SA:LP:DBM

*DA/P*

711.94/2540-8/35

Confidential File

JUN 28 1943

FILED

*711.94  
note  
711.942*



## DRAFT

## UNITED STATES JAPANESE DECLARATION ON ECONOMIC POLICY

## I. GENERAL POLICY

1. The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan undertake to cooperate fully in urging all nations to reduce trade barriers, to eliminate all forms of discrimination in international commercial relations, and in general to work toward the creation of conditions of international trade and international investment under which all countries will have a reasonable opportunity to secure, through peaceful trade processes, the means of acquiring those goods and commodities which each country needs for the safeguarding and development of its economy.

2. The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan undertake that each of them shall make its appropriate contribution toward the creation of the type of international economic relations envisaged above.

3. As important steps in that direction, the Government of the United States and the Government of Japan shall establish between themselves and shall seek to establish in the Pacific area the economic relationships indicated below.

## II. THE UNITED STATES-JAPAN RELATIONSHIP

1. The United States and Japan undertake to inaugurate, as rapidly as possible, all necessary measures for restoring the commercial, financial and other economic relationships between them to a normal basis.

2. The United States undertakes to accord Japan as favorable commercial treatment as it accords any third country.

3. Japan undertakes to accord the United States as favorable commercial treatment as it accords any third country.

4. The United States re-affirms its policy of abandoning its present preferential arrangements with the Philippine Islands and intends to move in the direction of abandoning its present preferential arrangement with Cuba. As regards the latter, the United States is prepared to give up unilaterally the preferences which it receives in Cuba as the first step toward a complete abrogation of the existing preferential relationship.

## III. POLICY IN THE PACIFIC AREA

1. Complete control over its economic, financial and monetary affairs shall be restored to China.

2. It is the intention of the Japanese Government that, upon the inauguration of negotiations for a peaceful settlement between Japan and China, the subsidiaries of certain Japanese companies, such as the North China Development Company and the Central Promotion China Company, will be divested, so far as Japanese official support may be involved, of any monopolistic or other preferential rights which they may exercise in fact or which may inure to them by virtue of the present circumstances in China under Japanese military occupation. It is likewise the intention of the Japanese Government to withdraw and to redeem the Japanese military notes which are being circulated in China and the notes of Japanese-sponsored regimes in China, the necessary measures to this end to be initiated immediately upon the inauguration of negotiations with the Government of Chungking for a peaceful settlement and the process of withdrawal and redemption to be concluded within a period of two years after the conclusion of a peaceful settlement.

3. The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan undertake not to seek in China any preferential or monopolistic commercial or other economic rights for themselves or their nationals, but to use all their influence toward securing from China commercial treatment for themselves no less favorable than that accorded to any third country and full cooperation in the promotion of the general policy stated in paragraph 1 of this Declaration.

4. The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan undertake to urge upon China the inauguration, with foreign assistance where necessary, of a comprehensive program of economic development, a full opportunity to participate in which shall be accorded the United States and Japan on terms no less favorable than those accorded any third country.

5. The relations between the United States and Japan, respectively, and other countries of the Pacific area shall be governed by the same basic principles as those stated above in the case of China, and the Governments of the United States and of Japan undertake to urge these countries, wherever feasible, to undertake comprehensive programs of economic development with full opportunity to participate in such programs accorded the United States and Japan on terms no less favorable than those accorded any third country.

SA: LP: DBM  
Nov. 12, 1941

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
FOREIGN ACTIVITY CORRELATION

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
DEC 11 1941  
Department of State

FE  
FC  
JCK  
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
FOREIGN ACTIVITY CORRELATION  
DEC 11 1941  
December 6, 1941  
Warren:  
1-10-42 ✓

Commander Davis of ONI called and said that he  
has received information that the Japanese Embassy  
burned its secret codes and ciphers yesterday.

701.9411

mf  
mf

701.9411/1532 1/2

FILED  
JAN 12 1942

GR

JOHN EDGAR HOOVER  
DIRECTOR



Federal Bureau of Investigation  
United States Department of Justice  
Washington, D. C.


December 5, 1941

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
DEC 8 1941  
Department of State

~~Doe~~  
FE  
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RR  
FE

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL  
SPECIAL MESSENGER

Honorable Adolf A. Berle, Jr.  
Assistant Secretary of State  
Department of State  
Washington, D. C.



*[Handwritten signature]*

My dear Mr. Berle:

Information has come to the attention of this Bureau through a highly confidential source indicating that on December 1, 1941, Shigeo Kobata of the Japanese Embassy, Washington, D. C., contacted a woman named Kinoshita in San Francisco, California, and advised her that the efforts of the Embassy were failing and all of the staff were getting ready to leave within twenty-four hours, although all of the officials were not going back to Japan. Kobata allegedly asserted that he had been given the choice of staying in the United States or going to either Mexico or Argentina and seemed unable to make up his mind as to which he would accept.


740.0011 F. W. / 917

Kinoshita reportedly inquired that if American-Japanese relations were broken and the Embassy was closed how long the resultant condition would last. She commented that the opinion of people in San Francisco was that the war would probably last two years. However, Kobata supposedly expressed the opinion that it would last longer.

It has also been reported that Kobata mentioned something about employees of the Embassy being placed in a concentration camp in the event of war, although he assured Kinoshita that "other people have nothing to worry about."

This information is being submitted as a matter of interest to you.

Sincerely yours,



FG/GCD

ADVISED BY POLITICAL RELATIONS  
MR. HONIGSBERG  
NOV 17 1941  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

NOV 19 1941

COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

November 15, 1941.

*[Handwritten scribbles and initials]*

Mr. Keswick called on me this afternoon. He told me what is set forth in the second paragraph of the attached memorandum. He said that his information was based on comment made to him by an adviser to the Netherlands East Indies Government whom Mr. Keswick met in Manila. The adviser to the Indies Government said that the Dutch secret service had seen a copy of the Japanese Prime Minister's instructions to Mr. Kurusu along the lines indicated.

The only other comment of special interest made by Mr. Keswick was that, speaking on a comparative basis, recent British official surveys had indicated that Malaya is overprepared, as contrasted with Burma, which is underprepared. Mr. Keswick said that no decision had been reached whether reinforcements for Burma would be sent from Malaya or from India.

111.34/2527

461112

*[Handwritten initials]*

NOV 19 1941

FILED

FE:MMH:HES

INDIA SECRETARY OF STATE  
NOV 18 1941  
MR. WELLES

2527  
20(57)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
 RECEIVED  
 NOV 22 1941  
 THE SECRETARY  
 DIVISION OF  
 COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

ADVISER ON POLITICAL RELATIONS  
 MR. HUNDELL  
 NOV 21 1941  
 DEPARTMENT OF STATE

November 15, 1941

*Roth*  
*FE*  
*DCR*

MEMORANDUM

127  
 Division of  
 FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
 NOV 21 1941  
 Department of State

The War Department has received the following report from the Commanding General at Honolulu:  
 Mr. Keswick, secretary to Duff Cooper, who traveled from the Far East to the Pacific Coast with Kurusu, and who is continuing on to Washington and London as a courier, states that Kurusu's mission to this country is to confirm reports that the United States Government is not bluffing; that if there is any weakness in our attitude the Japanese Government will continue on its path of aggression in a bigger and better way; but that if Kurusu and his Government are convinced of the strength and determination of the American Government, there is a strong possibility that there will be no further hostile actions on the part of the Japanese Government.

The foregoing was telephoned to me by Colonel Bratton, who suggested the possible advisability of a member of the Department talking with Keswick while he is here in Washington and before he leaves for London.

John F. Stone

FW 711.94/2527

NOV 23 1941

FILED PS (EP) 127

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
CONFIDENTIAL  
NOV 11 1941  
COMMUNICATIONS AND PROPAGANDA DIVISION

Code Radiogram  
Assigned at War Department  
November 11, 1941

SECRETARY OF STATE  
NOV 11 1941  
NOTED

Peiping, October 11, 1941.

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1112

793.94/17004

PS / MCS CONFIDENTIAL FILE

793.94

According to information said to have been given to the German embassy in Peiping by the Japanese military, Mr. Kurusu, the Japanese special envoy, is bringing proposals embodying the following points: First, Japan will withdraw from the axis. Second, she wishes, for reasons of "peace", to participate settlement of the Manchukuo problem. Third, negotiations on the subject of a new distribution of areas of influence in the Pacific. Fourth, Japan to continue economic expansion to the south, but to cease her military and political movements in that quarter. Fifth, Japan will agree to China's returning to the status she occupied prior to the start of the present war on July 7, 1937. The Japanese military are very much against these proposals.

U - LIAISON OFFICE  
NOV 12 1941  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

G-2 comment: G-2 feels that this report must at present be accepted with reserve.

Distribution:

- China Mission
- Mr. Louchlin Currie
- Assistant Secretary of War
- Assistant Secretary of War for Air
- Chief of the Army Air Force
- Chief of the Air Corps
- Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3
- Assistant Chief of Staff, WPD

- G.H.Q.
- State Department
- Director of Naval Intelligence
- Situation Section
- Far Eastern Section

NOV 11 1941

CONFIDENTIAL

INFORMATION COPY

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

NA  
This telegram must be  
closely paraphrased be-  
fore being communicated FROM  
to anyone. (SC)

Shipping via N. E.  
Dated November 11, 1941  
Rec'd 1:58 p.m.

Secretary of State  
Washington.

OFFICE OF POLITICAL RELATIONS  
NOV 17 1941  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

RECEIVED  
NOV 11 1941  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

348, November 11, 4 p.m. (Section 1)

Kurusu takes following program to Washington:

(one). Japan abandons Tripartite Pact; (two) Man-  
chukuo for future discussion; (three) distribution  
Pacific spheres influence; (four) Japan ceases pol-  
itical, military but not southward expansion; (five)  
China returns to status quo ante prior China incident.

He stated Japanese gendarmes desire sabotage any  
Washington agreement and have placed above informa-  
tion before German Embassy here.

foregoing obtained from different fairly reliable  
local contacts by AP representative who has also in-  
formed assistant Military and Naval Attaches who  
will doubtless inform their departments.

BUTRICK

WTC

NOV 21 1941

Confidential File

7-11-94/2432 PS/AD

7-11-94  
Lo's  
76-2-9-11  
73-31-11-11-11  
793-95

HMS



TELEGRAM RECEIVED

TO: SECRETARY OF STATE  
FROM: TOKYO  
SUBJECT: (S)

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

349, November 11, 4 p.m. (SECTION TWO).

I was told yesterday by a usually well-informed American that he had been reliably informed that there were two groups of high ranking naval officers, namely, the political to which Admirals Nomura and Toyoda belong and the service to which Admiral Oikawa belongs. Oikawa, then Navy Minister, desired to intercept American oil shipments to Vladivostok and risk war with us but was dissuaded by a General Suzuki. Presently President of Cabinet Planning Board. (END MESSAGE. Sent to the Department, repeated to Chungking, Shanghai, Tokyo).

BUTRICK.

UWC

7-11-74/2432

7-11-94/2432  
(SECTION 2)  
S/AO  
Confidential File

In reply to  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
RECORDED  
NOV 21 1941  
DIVISION OF  
COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

RB  
Division of  
EAST ASIAN  
AFFAIRS  
NOV 1 1941  
Department of State

*S*  
*FE/WH*

NAVY DEPARTMENT  
THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS  
WASHINGTON

SECRETARY OF STATE  
NOV 13 1941  
NOTED November 13, 1941.

SECRET

Memorandum for State Department.

The Commander South China Patrol reports that he has received the following information from the Assistant Military Attache who has obtained it from a reliable source:

THE JAPANESE EMISSARY IS CARRYING TO WASHINGTON THE FOLLOWING FIVE POINTS:

- (1) REDISTRIBUTION OF THE SPHERES OF INFLUENCE IN PACIFIC.
- (2) JAPANESE WITHDRAWAL FROM AXIS PACT.
- (3) JAPAN TO GIVE UP MILITARY AND POLITICAL ADVANCES SOUTHWARD BUT NOT HER ECONOMIC EXPANSION IN THAT DIRECTION.
- (4) FOR SAKE OF FACE MANCHUKUO NOT TO BE DISCUSSED FOR TIME BEING.
- (5) CHINA TO RETURN TO STATUS QUO EXISTING AT TIME OF MARCO POLO INCIDENT.

MILITARY FACTIONS ARE STRONGLY OPPOSED AND HAVE CONVEYED THE POINTS TO THE GERMAN EMBASSY PEIPING.

R. E. Schuirmann.

NOV 21 1941

740.0011 P.W.

740.0011 PACIFIC WAR/642

PS/ATB  
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Enclosure  
Classified Section File No.  
Copy No.

RECEIVED  
DEC 19 1941  
COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF

G-2 REPORT

Subject Mr. Kaswick Country Reported On Japan  
I.C. No.

Source and Degree of Reliability:  
Interview with Mr. Kaswick by Col. A.E. Andrews, Friday, November 14, 1941

Summary of Report  
What Reported

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
DEC 7 1941  
Department of State

To: ACoFS, G-2, WD, Washington, D. C.

1. In compliance with your radiogram November 13, I met Mr. Kaswick, who arrived by clipper at 10:00 a.m. today. Remained with him, acting as aid, until 11:30 at the United Airlines office from which he was to leave at 11:45 for the airport.
2. During the conversation with Mr. Kaswick, he made two points in his estimate of affairs:
  - a. Mr. Kurusu's mission is to ascertain whether or not the United States is bluffing.
  - b. If Japan finds out the United States is not bluffing she will back down.
3. Attention is invited to my confidential telegram of this date.

AIR MAIL

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
DEC 11 1941

DEC 18 1941

A. E. ANDREWS  
Colonel, Infantry  
Officer in Charge  
S.F. Office, MID

G-2 Distribution: 4, 5, 6

From SAN FRANCISCO OFFICE Report No. 47 Date November 15, 1941

74C.0011 PACIFIC WAR/14SHEM  
PS/CWR

(COPY)

21st September, 1944.

Dear Mr. Secretary,

I have just been informed over the telephone by a representative of the press that Congressman Church informed the House of Representatives this afternoon that he held a sworn statement that on some private occasion I had said that in Australia, forty-eight hours before Pearl Harbour, I knew that a Japanese task force was about to attack somewhere and that a little later I learned that it was about to attack American territory. I at once informed the press, as the fact is, that I had never had any information that any Japanese force was about to attack any territory of the United States or any information that any warlike measures were likely to be taken against the United States and never said so.

I have not yet had an opportunity of seeing the Congressional Record or any other report of what actually took place in the House, but I felt that I should not delay acquainting you with the matter.

Yours sincerely,

(Sgd.) Owen Dixon

The Honourable Cordell Hull,  
Secretary of State of the United States,  
Washington, D.C.

Representative Harness in the course of an address  
in the House of Representatives on September 22 made the  
following statement:

QUOTE There appears to be an abundance  
of evidence to show that 72 hours before the  
attack on Pearl Harbor, the Australian Govern-  
ment advised the American Government in Washington  
that an aircraft carrier task force of the Japanese  
Navy had been sighted by Australian reconnaissance  
headed toward Pearl Harbor; that our Government was  
advised 72 hours before the attack that this  
Japanese task force was still in progress toward  
Hawaii, and the same notification was sent 24 hours  
before Pearl Harbor. None of this information was,  
I am informed, given to General Short. UNQUOTE.

The Department received no such report from the  
Australian Government to the American Government.

Please get in touch with the appropriate Australian  
authorities at once and inquire whether they have any  
information concerning the report which Representative  
Harness states was made by the Australian Government to  
the American Government QUOTE that an aircraft carrier  
task force of the Japanese Navy had been sighted by  
Australian reconnaissance headed toward Pearl Harbor. UNQUOTE.

Telegraph your reply as soon as possible.

BC: JDR:MDM  
2/12/44

Hully

100-100-100

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

INCOMING TELEGRAM

DIVISION OF COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS


This telegram must be paraphrased before being communicated to any agency other than a Government agency. (RESTRICTED)

Case No.

Dated September 14, 1944

Rec'd 7:19 a.m.

Secretary of State  
Washington



US URGENT

110, September 14, 11 a.m.

Commenting on Press report that Representative Scott had made the same statement, the Prime Minister on September 7, in answer to a question at his press conference, said: "This is pure invention. Our cables had no data regarding the Japanese fleet" (Reference Department's telegram No. 102, September 12, 7 p.m.)

9-1244  
JOHNSON

RR


740.0011 P.W. / 9-1444  
OMM 740.0011 P.W. / 9-1444

SEP 15 1944

EXCERPT FROM REMARKS BY REPRESENTATIVE  
McCORMACK IN THE HOUSE, SEPTEMBER 21, 1944

"I am also authorized by the State Department, having discussed this with Assistant Secretary Breckinbridge Long who cleared it with Secretary Hull, to make the following statement:

'The Department of State did not receive prior to December 7, 1941, from the Australian Government or from any other source information as alleged to the effect that Japanese naval units were heading toward the Hawaiian Islands. There was no oral communication to the Department of State on that subject by anybody, either private citizen or official. There was no written communication received by the Department of State on that subject or to that effect. When the allegation was made that information to this effect had been received from Australia, the State Department instructed the American Minister in Canberra to get in touch with the Australian authorities at once and inquire whether they had any information concerning the report that the Australian Government had informed the American Government "that an aircraft carrier task force of the Japanese Navy had been sighted by Australian reconnaissance headed toward Pearl Harbor." The American Minister to Australia replied on September 14, 1944, that the Australian Prime Minister stated: "This is pure invention. Our cables had no data regarding the Japanese Fleet." ' "



CONFIDENTIAL



December 30, 1941

My dear Mr. Justice:

In your letter dated December 19, you request that I write to you, as Chairman of the Commission to Investigate the Facts and Circumstances connected with the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, stating whether I "conveyed to the Departments of War and Navy of the United States, in the period intervening between November 1 and December 7, 1941, warnings of the immediate danger of possible attack by the forces of the Japanese Empire". You add that for your purposes it will be sufficient if I "will state briefly approximately the times when such warnings were given and, in outline and summary only, the purport of the warnings".

I would say in reply that I have constantly kept myself as familiar as possible with all important developments and conditions arising in the relations of the United States with other countries. Recognizing the cooperative relationships which exist between the Department of State and the Departments of War and of the Navy,

Mr. Justice Roberts,

Chairman, Commission to Investigate the Facts  
and Circumstances connected with the  
Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor.

-2-

Navy, especially in times of danger to this country, I had during the year many conferences with the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy and at intervals conferences with the Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations and officers of their staffs. Our conferences sought a full interchange of information and views relative to critical situations all over the world, including--of course--developments in the Pacific area.

These exchanges of information and views were in addition to those which took place at Cabinet meetings and at meetings during the fall of 1941 of the War Council, and in numerous other conversations. At these conferences I was given the benefit of the knowledge which representatives of the War and the Navy Departments possessed of military factors involved in the world situation and I in turn took up political factors in the world situation and other matters of which I had special knowledge.

In reply to your express inquiry, I recall that at the regular meeting of the Cabinet on November 7, 1941, I stated among other things that relations between Japan and the United States were extremely critical and that there was imminent possibility that Japan might at any time start a new military movement of conquest by force

in

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in accordance with her many times announced purpose and policy. It thereupon became the consensus of opinion that some members of the Cabinet might well emphasize this critical situation in speeches in order that the country would, if possible, be better prepared for such a development. Accordingly, Secretary Knox, four days later on Armistice Day, delivered an address, in which he especially emphasized this imminent and dangerous situation. He expressed the following strong warning:

" . . . . . We are not only confronted with the necessity of extreme measures of self-defense in the Atlantic, but we are likewise faced with grim possibilities on the other side of the world-- on the far side of the Pacific. Just what the morrow may hold for us in that quarter of the globe, no one may say with certainty. The only thing we can be sure of is that the Pacific, no less than the Atlantic, calls for instant readiness for defense. In the Pacific area, no less than in Europe, interests which are vital to our national security are seriously threatened."

On the same day Under Secretary of State Welles, carrying out this Cabinet suggestion in an address, used the following language of urgent warning:

" . . . . . today the United States finds itself in far greater peril than it did in 1917. The waves of world conquest are breaking high both in the East and in the West. They are threatening, more nearly each day that passes, to engulf our own shores.

" . . . . .

"In the Far East the same forces of conquest under a different guise are menacing the safety of all nations that border upon the Pacific."

" . . . . . our

-4-

" . . . . our people realize that at any moment war may be forced upon us, and if it is, the lives of all of us will have to be dedicated to preserving the freedom of the United States, and to safeguarding the independence of the American people, which are more dear to us than life itself."

It will thus be seen that knowledge of the gravity of the situation in the Pacific was not confined to me, but was shared by many high officers of the Government. I might add that throughout this period officials of the Departments of War and of the Navy manifested a spirit of wholehearted cooperation and indicated in statements made to me from time to time their keen concern regarding the seriousness and critical nature of the danger.

On November 25 and on November 28, at meetings of the War Council, at which the highest officers of the Army and the Navy of course were present, I emphasized the critical nature of the relations of this country with Japan: I stated to the conference that there was practically no possibility of an agreement being achieved with Japan; that in my opinion the Japanese were likely to break out at any time with new acts of conquest by force; and that the matter of safeguarding our national security was in the hands of the Army and the Navy. At the conclusion I with due deference expressed my judgment that any plans for our military defense should include an assumption that

the

-5-

the Japanese might make the element of surprise a central point in their strategy and also might attack at various points simultaneously with a view to demoralizing efforts of defense and of coordination for purposes thereof.

Sincerely yours,

CH: VHS (T&)  
12/27

12  
12

PA/H  
5/24

La 